This paper investigates how the nascent American republic prosecuted the War for Independence. Specifically, it looks at the problem of waging war under a Republican government distrustful of standing armies and incapable of implementing the sophisticated fiscal and bureaucratic structures used by other western military powers during the eighteenth century. Here, I argue that it was the Continental Army itself that functioned as an arm of wartime national governance by intervening in the civilian sphere. Its authority manifested in various forms, from the intrusive confiscation of civilian property to more benign exhibitions of authority such as parades and social gathering. As a case study, this paper uses the Continental Army's 1779-1780 winter encampment at Morristown, New Jersey. Winter encampments are useful subjects of study since they most vividly and directly exhibit the interaction between military authority and civilian life, and highlight the important role armies played beyond the battlefield. The Morristown encampment provides a particularly useful study as it took place at a time when the stresses of waging a long war were beginning to have serious consequences for both military and civilian leaders. Indeed, thus study will show that the Continental Army's maintenance of positive civilian relations often came at the price of harming relations with the Army's own rank-and-file. Overall, this paper seeks to better our understanding of the intersection between military institutions and governance during the War of Independence, with a particular emphasis on how these relationships impacted the course of the war in New Jersey.
This paper explores the winter and spring of 1780 in New Jersey, to better understand the social and political factors that shaped how revolutionary America made war. I argue that the strains of conflict exacerbated the social fissures and political tensions within the American state's republican structure. The paradoxical nature of republicanism's ideological and social foundations profoundly affected the colonies' conduct during the war. The republic's government and people distrusted professional standing armies and the strong central governments required for their maintenance, yet the realities of eighteenth century warfare made a professional army necessary to safeguard the republic. Thus, this paper uses the Morristown encampment and Springfield campaign to trace how Americans coped with these difficulties and the ultimate legacies of this process.
Here I study three agents of change: civilians, common soldiers, and officers. In the absence of a centralized national authority to provide adequate food and equipment, common soldiers responded to the poor logistics and pay by disobeying their officers and plundering supplies from the surrounding population. Civilians suffered from this plunder as well as from royalist raids and confiscations sanctioned by Army officers. Civilians responded in a variety of ways: voicing their concerns through civilian political leaders, non-compliance with military orders, and illicit trade with the British garrison in New York. Officers sought to maintain the Army's strength despite the absence of support from the national government, while also attempting to secure New Jersey and its civilians and keeping its rank-and-files in line.
I argue that the Continental Army utilized several strategies, dependent upon exploiting conceptions of Republican society and ideology, to foster a fragile cooperation in New Jersey during 1780. Most importantly, in the absence of a strong national authority, I contend the Continental Army itself behaved as a sovereign body. At its Morristown headquarters, the Army's leaders received foreign ambassadors, held formal parades and social gatherings, and dispensed military discipline. Politically, this display of pageantry served to demonstrate to New Jersey civilians a facet of the national government that was strong and stable; ideologically, these acts exhibited the officers' statuses as virtuous gentlemen, a key element of the republican order.
Conversely, the common soldiers were confined to camp and severely punished for any disciplinary transgressions, particularly violations of civilian property. This contrast between officers' and soldiers' experiences illustrates the wider divides in American society, even as Americans struggled to forge and safeguard a new nation founded upon republican principals.
Thus, my examination of the Continental Army reflects, like any other institution, the society from which it was produced.
Like any institution, the Continental Army's behavior was determined by its environments. Just as the mountains and forests of its ecological environment determined where the Army marched and how it fought its battles, so too did the colonies' political, legal, and social environments determine how the Army received its funding, quartered its officers, and recruited its soldiers. From the military historian's perspective, understanding these contexts is crucially important to comprehending the American war-effort, as well as placing the Continental Army in comparative context. Republicanism is the key to understanding why the colonies could never craft a central government with the fiscal power of Great Britain, why its independent-minded and politically aware population would not acquiesce to conscription as in Prussia, and why and its leaders, suspicious of radicalization, could not entertain the dangers of wholesale popular mobilization in the way of revolutionary France a decade later. America, in sum, did produce the minutemen and the Continentals, but it did not yield grenadier guards or a levee en masse. Underpinning this drama throughout was republican ideology. When American radicals overturned British rule in the colonies, they could not have known the arduousness of the coming military struggle; certainly the government they crafted at the outset of the conflict was illequipped to fight the war. Instead, it was the Continental Army, out of its own logistical necessity, that cultivated and maintained civilian support for the struggle. Historians have largely missed the power military authority had during the conflict; they have fail to realize that just because there was no military government does not preclude the existence of military governance. Thus, military authority becomes a useful lens onto understanding American republicanism, as officers strove to maintain the Army and the war-effort without violating republican principals. As the following pages reveal, this was not an easy task, as republican ideals fell to wartime exigencies. That republicanism did of course survive the war and flourish does not mean that it was not tested during the conflict, and it is the nature, and ultimate effect of this trial that historians have yet to truly uncover.
The arrival of some 13,000 Continental soldiers in Morris County in late 1779 presented serious difficulties for officers, soldiers, and civilians. As one of the largest and most concentrated encampments of the war, the cantonment at Morristown was to severely tax both the Army and governmental logistical apparatuses as well as the civilian economy. Coupled with the national fiscal crisis, deteriorating morale in the ranks, and declining popular enthusiasm for the war, the winter at Morristown was to exhibit the perils and strains of making war as much as any battle or campaign. During the Army's seven-month stay in Morris County, civilians became increasingly disenchanted with the Army, rank-and-file soldiers lost confidence in their leaders, and officers were left to manage the conflicting interests of these disparate groups.
Thus, even away from the battlefield, a drama unfolded that exhibited all of the fragilities and insecurities of the American wartime republic. 5
The Continental Army's leaders planned the 1780 winter encampment with civilian relations in mind. During a previous stay at Morristown in early 1777, the Army had had numerous negative interactions with the community, highlighted by a smallpox outbreak that the inhabitants blamed on the presence of the Army. In 1777, the small Continental Army (3000 men at most) billeted in private homes, but the subsequent growth of the Army as well as civilian outrage meant that by 1779 this option was no longer available. Thus, when the Continental Army once again arrived in Morris County in December 1779, its leaders chose to encamp the soldiers in a sparsely populated wood known as Jockey Hollow, five miles south of the town. 6 While Jockey Hollow did offer secure ground and ample lumber, Army leadership also chose this location because of its distance from the civilian population center at Morristown. In contrast to the 1777 encampment, concentrating at Jockey Hollow would inconvenience only the half-dozen farmers who inhabited the area. The five miles between Morristown and Jockey Hollow were in a way a social quarantine, segregating the potentially unruly, rapacious soldiery from the genteel Whig community to the north. Yet, events that winter were to prove that soldiers and civilians could not be kept separate so easily.
Historians have downplayed the extent unfamiliarity played in shaping relations between civilians and soldiers, as well as between soldiers themselves. In some ways, the Continental Army resembled an occupying foreign Army more than a force with New Jersey's interests at heart. First and foremost, the Army was composed predominantly of soldiers from other states. Not only were the soldiers from unfamiliar geographical origins, but they were from different socioeconomic backgrounds as well. In contrast to the well-to-do farmers, craftsmen, and merchants of the Morristown area, most of the soldiers in the Continental Army by 1780 were overwhelmingly of the lowest class of laborers and recent immigrants. European professional armies were generally seen as both separate from and below the social order, and, as the Continental Army came to increasingly resemble its European counterparts, it too was ostracized. 8
As supplies began to dwindle shortly after the Army's arrival, hunger became a primary concern. The local magazine was apparently depleted rapidly after the Army's December 3 arrival, as by the middle of the month accounts already noted the lack of provisions. 9 This deficiency reached its height in early January, when the entire Army was placed on starvation rations. 10 Men were told their two pound ration of meat was to last ten days, though even this meager supply was rarely available to every man. 11 Improving weather conditions later in the month allowed supplies to be transferred from other magazines, temporarily improving the food situation. 12 It might appear then, that the near-catastrophic absence of victuals from the Morristown encampment was more a byproduct of inadequate transportation further hindered by snowy weather conditions, rather than any failure of government, finance, or civilian political will. Indeed, Historian John Shy has attributed the Americans' supply difficulties to issues of transportation and distribution. 13 Yet, in the case of the Morristown encampment, supply deficiencies transcended transportation problems. Morristown itself was selected in part because it stood astride the lateral lines of communication stretching from Philadelphia northwards towards West Point, while also dominating local routes connecting Newark, Elizabeth, and Bergen County with the communities of the state's interior. 14 Therefore, a lack of roads themselves cannot be blamed for the Army's supply difficulties.
The weather may appear to have played a decisive role in hindering supply, given the amount of snow that accumulated in New Jersey that winter; however, this supposition is also problematic. By 1780 the Continental Army had the manpower to delegate parties specifically tasked with clearing snow from roads to maintain lines of communication, and on several occasions during the winter supply convoys arrived despite the poor weather. 15 Yet, even with roads cleared and the overall improvement in the climate after February, near-famine periodically returned to the Morristown encampment. 16 For example, in late March, soldiers endured a four day period without bread. 17 This second period of hunger lasted into the next month, with meat rations completely absent in early April. 18 This distress appears to have been alleviated as April progressed, only to return the following month, when soldiers were reduced to half rations on May 22nd. 19 Writing during this third period of hunger, James Thatcher summed up the Army's exasperation, writing, "we are again visited with the calamity of which we have so often complained, a great scarcity of provisions of every kind." 20 Overall, the Morristown encampment experienced three periods of "great scarcity," the first occurring during the first week of January, the second between March 20th and April 3rd, and the last during the final week in May. Furthermore, deficiency, though not outright starvation, prevailed through much of December, April, and May. Notably, the two month period from mid-January to mid-March was one of relative plenty, even though the "hard winter" was 14 Wacker, 15-21. 15 still at its height during these months. Conversely, from late-March onwards the Army drifted between hunger and starvation, despite the generally fine weather. Shy's hypothesis, that transportation and distribution were the primary determinants of logistical problems, is at odds with the realities of the Morristown encampment. The Army enjoyed only two months of consistently available food, and this came at a time when snowfalls were heavy and travel difficult. Two of the three periods of "great scarcity" occurred after the worst of the winter was over and transportation should not have been a problem, particularly in such a well-situated location as Morristown. That the Continental Army spent 70% of its time at Morristown short of food indicates a much greater logistical problem than simply inadequate transportation.
Contemporaries, too, did not see transportation as a significant logistical issue, and aside from orders detailing fatigue parties to clear roads, there are few accounts from the winter encampment concerning roads. 21 Instead, American officers were far more concerned with their inability to procure supplies locally. Washington recognized that in the absence of an advanced logistical infrastructure based on magazines and civilian purchasing agents, the Army was reliant upon what the local inhabitants were willing to part with. The American commander-in-chief wrote to Congress shortly after the beginning of the encampment to express his concerns, stating, "I confess I am greatly alarmed at the prospect of our supplies of provision which so much depend on that of forage." 22 It quickly became apparent that the root cause of the Army's forage problems was the depreciated currency. For instance, as the first famine period began in late December, James Thatcher wrote that "the people in the country are unwilling to sell the produce of their farms for this depreciated currency." 23 General James Clinton echoed Thatcher the following month, when he wrote "our money is so reduced that I fear it will not purchase a 21 Harmar, January 3, 1780, LWS, 157; Washington, January 6, 1780, PC 9, 695. 22 Washington to Congress, December 10, 1779, PC 9, 695. 23 Thatcher, December 20, 1780, LWS Box, 67, 168. further supply." 24 Indeed, the inflated currency did greatly inhibit the Army's ability to purchase supplies form the local inhabitants, who often times outright refused to accept the Continental Dollar as legal tender. 25 That the Army's financial difficulties, and therefore its logistical problems, were a product of the inability of the Continental Congress to craft an effective wartime national state was not lost on observers in the Army. Alexander Scammel contrasted the Army's perseverance in the face of hardship with Congress's perceived ineffectiveness, noting, "if Congress can contrive a method to appreciate currency as quickly as we can build huts, our affairs would soon assume a promising aspect." 26 Yet Scammel's desire never came to fruition, leaving the Continental Army to search for other methods to rectify its supply deficiency.
Early in the encampment, the rank-and-file at Jockey Hollow crafted their own solution to the Army's supply problem by stealing from civilians. Certainly, even the limited physical activity of the winter encampment could not be sustained on a diet of bread, or even less. 27 Even in their isolated location at Jockey Hollow, the soldiers could not have remained ignorant of the fact that even as they starved, New Jersey civilians continued to eat well. Thatcher indeed described the encampment to be "in the midst of a country abounding in every kind of provisions." 28 As an armed, organized body of men, the Army's rank-and-file were wellpositioned to appropriate this abundance from the surrounding communities, despite their officers' proscriptions, leading Washington to write "the property of the inhabitants in the vicinity of camp is prey to the plundering spirit of the soldiery. Civilian property of various kinds was threatened in this atmosphere of increasing desperation and deteriorating discipline. The constant transit of undisciplined soldiers through the countryside could also harm civilian property even when nothing was being stolen, as complaints about trampled wheat fields indicate. 30 Certainly, food was the soldiers' primary concern, and poultry, sheep, pigs, and cattle were among the most commonly stolen items. 31 Alcohol, a necessity in the eyes of many soldiers, was another commonly stolen good. 32 Other items were also prey to soldiers, especially rail fences, which were often stripped by rank-andfile for firewood. 33 The claims of damages made by Morris County civilians provide the best details of the nature of the plunder taking place in the Jockey Hollow area. Resident Josiah Guerin, for example, filed claims for "one calf, some sheep, two bushels of rye, six bushels of potatoes, two narrow axes, one greatcoat, blanketing, a new linen petticoat, and two half-worn shifts." 34 Other civilian claims list a similar litany of items. 35 While livestock and foodstuffs were the most prevalent items stolen, the frequent mentions of clothing, tools, and utensils indicate that plunder was about more than supplementing meager rations, but a breakdown in discipline.
Crimes were not limited to the sparsely populated Jockey Hollow area. Detachments of soldiers in Morristown itself also had negative interactions with the local population, just as in 1777. 36 While soldiers' depredations were generally limited to theft, on occasion more confrontational transgressions also took place. In one instance, a soldier had a violent altercation 30 with a Morristown woman, which ended with a threat by him to burn down her house. 37 Regular operations also brought soldiers into contact with other civilian communities like nearby Vealtown and Pluckemin, increasing the opportunities for further negative interactions. 38 Moreover, the threat of marauding becoming a habit among soldiers was a very real fear To mitigate civilian agitation in the face of the soldiers' depredations, Continental Army leadership resorted to several different tactics. First, by issuing general orders prohibiting plundering, officers not only sought to restrict soldiers' actions but also to make clear to the civilian community that whenever plundering did take place, it was not sanctioned by the Army.
The Army's first response was to seek to tighten discipline through corporal punishment.
Washington directed his officers to use "every method in their powers to convince depredations 37 of so pernicious a nature will not except the most exemplary punishment." 40 Thus, as injuries to civilian property continued, the Continental Army resorted to harsher disciplinary measures. For example, John de Armor, after an infraction against Morristown resident Katherine Slover, was sentenced to receive "one hundred stripes on his naked back." 41 Three soldiers who broke into a Morristown storehouse were similarly sentenced. 42 As the winter progressed and plundering continued, the Continental Army changed tactics. Although trials and sentences were usually carried out at the Jockey Hollow encampment, during the spring proceedings were moved to Morristown itself. 43 Here, at a venue more readily visible to the public, Army leadership could demonstrate to the public that whatever depredations the soldiery might commit, the officers remained a disciplinary force.
To more vividly demonstrate to the public the Army's commitment to punishing crimes against civilians, leadership took more extreme measures later in the encampment. During February 1780, three members of a Pennsylvania regiment were found guilty of plundering and were sentenced to hanging. 44 Although accounts vary, it appears that at least one of those soldiers convicted were in fact executed while the others were pardoned. 45 On another occasion the following month, four soldiers from Pennsylvania regiments were found guilty of "plundering Mr. Bogart, an inhabitant near Paramus." 46 Some empathy did exist between soldiers and civilians, as these men were also sentenced to death, but their reputations as generally disciplined soldiers and the intervention of the aggrieved Mr. Bogart led to pardon, indicating that republican sentiments did, on occasion, cross status boundaries. 40 Yet, even as the Army tried and sentenced soldiers for plundering, it also could not ignore that, when faced with dwindling finances, sometimes outright confiscation was the only means of keeping soldiers supplied. Headquarters initially directed quartermasters to purchase supplies from the region's inhabitants, since during bad weather the Army was forced to rely on local sources for logistics. New York's General James Clinton reported that with the magazines exhausted by early January, "the commissaries can have the wheat that has been collected from the farmers in consequence of our laws." 47 With the advent of the financial crisis in 1780, headquarters commanded quartermasters to "borrow of them (civilians) giving them assurances to return the same quantity, when the situation of our supplies will permit, and if this shall prove ineffectual, they will take from those who will be least injured thereby, giving vouchers for the quantities they receive." 48 Josiah Harmar of the Pennsylvania Line lamented being "obliged to be under the disagreeable necessity of ordering our parties to take provisions from the inhabitants and give them certificates therefore." 49 Directives such as this indicate that while the Continental Army's leadership did frequently proscribe and punish soldiers for taking civilian items, they nevertheless recognized that there was often little alternative. 50
The key difference here is that the confiscation of goods was part of an authorized strategy sanctioned by headquarters, as opposed to the wonton acts of plunder perpetrated by the soldiers themselves. More importantly, these orders at least maintained a pretense that the government would provide compensation at a later date. While what general orders termed "borrowing," may have been essentially the same as theft, they at least gave the promise of disciplined marauding soldiers to maintain cohesion, resorting to the whip in the American Army had the added benefit of demonstrating to civilians the Army's concern for republican attitudes towards individual rights and private property.
The Continental Army's strategy rested on this differentiation between the organized acts of plunder directed from headquarters from the plundering committed by individuals. While property taken by the quartermaster's office could be written off as requisitions, individual soldiers who took from civilians were charged with theft. Publicly visible trials and punishments demonstrated to the population that indiscipline was not to be tolerated. Headquarters own rhetoric exhibited the contrast between authorized requisition and unauthorized plunder.
Washington characterized the behavior of his soldiers as "better becoming a band of robbers than disciplined troops called forth in defense of the rights of the community." 51 This statement vividly illustrates the social ills both officers and civilians perceived in the common soldiers, while also incorporating the language of republican ideology. The general attitude of Army leadership was similar. Actions authorized and organized by officers were sanctioned as an integral part of the revolutionary struggle, while the depredations of the rank-and-file were prohibited and punished severely. 51 General Orders, December 29, 1779, LWS 67, 277. It is apparent that, by 1780, both armies were cognizant of inextricable linkages between finance, supply, and civilian sentiments. For the British, this meant an undermining of the civilian economy through armed attacks on private property and public stores. In the southern theatre, Royal officers looked to achieve similar ends through different means. 52 For the Continental Army, finance and supply presented a difficult dilemma as officers were left to balance the needs of their starving soldiers with the attitudes of the civilian population. Carp has shown how a failed financial system threatened to delegitimize the national government in the eyes of American civilians. 53 Here I argue that an ill-disciplined rank-and-file presented an equally dangerous threat to national legitimacy. The task for Continental officers then, was to keep their soldiers as best supplied as possible while causing a minimal amount of civilian consternation.
A key to this strategy was to court a positive public image. Thus, when officers took from civilians, they benefited from perceptions of them as virtuous gentlemen, a valuable source of credibility soldiers lacked. 54 Maintaining a martial image was a particular concern throughout the Army, as the preponderance of orders emphasizing proper uniform and equipment indicates. In Hazen's regiment, for example, orders directed soldiers "great care must be taken to preserve the regimental clothing which must at all times be kept neat and clean." 63 Issues of clothing supply permeate general orders throughout the encampment. 64 The headquarters itself exhibited the pageantry of a sovereign capital, with an estimated 50 or more guards, servants, and staff present inside the home. The headquarters more than just gave the appearance of a sovereign; it also functioned as one by receiving foreign dignitaries and state delegations. Civilians were made intimately aware of the growing internationalization of 60 the war with the visit of the Spanish envoy, Don Juan de Mirrales, in April 1780. 65 Mirrales' death from illness at the encampment was followed by an apparent display of military pageantry, for Ebenezer Parkman recorded "the Spaniard {was} buried with great pomp." 66 Parkman was similarly impressed by the pageantry accompanying a visit from the French ambassador Luzerne, writing "troops assembled to salute the French Ambassador his excellency, with the grandee and they ladies waited on him in the field...thirteen cannon were fired. A very grand appearance." 67 A concurrent military parade directed by von Steuben served to impress both the foreign visitor and the local inhabitants. 68 Social gatherings reminiscent of Europe's military aristocracy followed the celebrations. Thatcher records, "Washington and the French minister attended a ball, provided by our principal officers, at which were present a numerous collection of ladies and gentlemen of distinguished character. Fireworks were also exhibited by officers of the artillery." 69 Similar parades were held in Morristown the following month, with much emphasis given to an ordered, disciplined appearance; this time both a visiting delegation from Congress and Lafayette were present. 70 Overall, these activities at the winter headquarters reveal another facet to the Army's exhibiting a martial image, the Continental Army's officers promoted faith in the cause through symbolic gestures of power, even as an actual manifestation of national sovereignty, a sound currency, evaporated. Thus, transforming Morristown into "the military capital of the revolution," as a stand-in for an ineffective national government, provided New Jersey's civilians with a symbol of national authority to believe in even as that nation's Army took their crops in exchange for worthless vouchers.
Overall, the Army strove to exhibit discipline and subordination of officers over soldiers to New Jersey's inhabitants, characterizing the soldiers' plundering as acts of theft committed by brigands and robbers to be punished by whippings and hangings, meanwhile highlighting the officers' perceived qualities of virtue and status to court civilian loyalty even as the Army confiscated private goods for its own survival. Ultimately, though, the Americans' republican values proved resilient. Despite soldiers' plundering and officers' confiscations, New Jersey's inhabitants did not turn wholesale against the republican government, nor did they instigate a loyalist insurgency. While the Continental Army leadership did take civilian possessions without paying for them and did indeed place a substantial burden on the population, they never threatened to supplant civilian political leadership with a military government. Ultimately it was the soldiers that suffered most. Poorly supplied, when they took matters into their own hands they were severely punished by their military leaders and ostracized from the surrounding civilian community, and indeed the final years of the war did see several large mutinies, beginning with the Connecticut Line at Morristown in 1780. 73 Yet, these mutinies never spread to the whole Army, and no radicalized soldiery ever threatened the country's social or political status quo. Nor did the rank-and-file completely descend into wholesale undisciplined brigandry. 73 For mutiny in the Continental Army, see Niemeyer (1996), 130-159. For a more detailed treatment of the subject, see Carl Van Doren. Mutiny in January: The story of a Crisis in the Continental Army, (Viking 1943) . For a more recent study, see John A. Nagy. Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies in the American Revolution (Westholme, 2007).
